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I
The struggle of organized labor for the union shop has challenged government with baffling problems of policy and law. The
solution emerging in this time of national crisis warrants study; it will
strongly influence the permanent structure of industrial government;
and the process of evolving the solution is a drama of the birth of
law incomparable in its compression, its power, its pulsating actuality,
and its ultimate significance. My colleague, Professor Lenhoff, trained
in the continental tradition and learned alike in European and American labor law, when I told him of my study, commented genially and
Nwithout any intention to disparage, "Ah, but that's not laW; it's politics".' Yet in the recent Little Steel case in which the National War
Labor Board granted the labor unions "union maintenance", the practical and shrewd employer member, Mr. Roger Lapham, dissenting, said,
* Professor William G. Rice, Jr., and the author of this article have prepared a
report on the work of the National Defense Mediation Board which is now available
in mimeograph and will soon be issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It will be
referred to as REPORT NDMB. The report as printed will have appended the text of
all "Recommendations" and Opinions, as well as histories of all cases. These are not
appended to the report as mimeographed. These opinions are at present available only
in mimeograph at the offices of the present War Labor Board. The same is true of
the "Directive Orders" and Opinions, Panel Reports, etc., of the War Labor Board.
The cases will be referred to by name and docket number, e. g., for Mediation Board
Where decisions have
cases, MB No. -; for the War Labor Board, WLB No. -.
been summarized in the Labor Relations Reporter, a citation to that service has been
included.
t A. B., 1925, Johns Hopkins University; LL. B., 1928, S.J. D., 1932, Harvard
University; Member of the California bar; Professor of Law, University of Buffalo,
School of Law; author of invectve and Investigation in Administrative Law (1939)
52 HARv. L. REv. 1201, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process (1940)
25 IowA L. REV. 485, and other articles in various legal periodicals.
I. Professor Powell had a similar experience with Professor Redlich, similarly a
former professor of the University of Vienna. MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1941) 278.
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"Continued action of this sort by an agency of the government has the
effect of law, albeit not on the statute books".
Llewellyn and Hoebel have shown us recently in their The Cheyenne Way the process whereby in a primitive, tightly integrated society
the patterns of law emerge out of the totality of social behavior, born
of the exigency of the moment and through the moment carrying forward the play of force upon force; a unity moving glacially through
an infinite succession of syntheses. It is this process heightened by the
freshness and excitement of contemporaneousness which is at work
before our eyes. Crisis and crushing need are telescoping the process,
crowding all its sprawling elements into high relief so that it comes to
us with the deceptive clarity of a laboratory demonstration.
The task of solving the problem of union status has fallen principally upon boards set up by the President under Emergency and War
Powers; in the anxious, vacillating days before Pearl Harbor, upon
the National Defense Mediation Board; and now, in the war, upon the
National War Labor Board. It is not easy to locate or define the jurisdiction of these agencies in the formal legal-constitutional sense. On
September 8, 1939, the President declared the existence of a national
emergency which made available statutory powers conditioned on such
a declaration, and any further powers which the Constitution might
confer on the Executive, though what they might be in the absence
2
of war or rebellion there is little in or out of the books to tell us.
The great spurt of armament production in 1940 stimulated labor to
seek a new level of wages and led to the increase-in strikes which is
a typical incident of rising production. This alarmed those in charge
of the defense program. It threatened the schedules. It intensified
recrimination between labor and anti-labor forces. The need and
urgency of a war program already divided the country into hostile,
denunciatory groups; the labor quarrel was an opportunity for mutual
charges of obstruction. Into this disheartening struggle for a unified
public opinion the President threw a new Executive Order,3 this time
setting up a National Defense Mediation Board with authority to
mediate labor disputes. The Board was required to handle such disputes as were certified by the Secretary of Labor to be obstructing the
production or transportation of equipment or materials essential to
national defense and to be beyond adjustment by the conciliators of
the Department of Labor. By mediation is meant a process wherein
third persons seek to persuade the parties voluntarily to agree. It is
See the treatment of this problem in Note (1942) 55 HAgv. L. REV. 427, 5073. ExEc. ORDER 8716, March 19, 1941, 6 FED. RE . 1532 (March
21, 1941); see
Labor in Wartime (1942) 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 371 et seq.; Note (1942) 40
MicH. L. REv. io4i.
518.
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a formal process only in the sense that the mediator is invested with
authority to approach the parties in the name of government, and that
the parties may, at will, make themselves continuously available for
persuasion. It was this process (set up, to be sure, under the most
august auspices) which the Executive Order appeared to provide. Subsection 2 (b) authorizing the Board to arrange for arbitration did not
carry the scheme any further since arbitration would be no more than
an agreement arrived at by mediation. But the bridge from voluntarism to compulsion was subtly foreshadowed in Subsection 2 (d).
"To investigate issues between employers and employees,
. , conduct hearings, take testimony, make findings of fact,
and formulate recommendations for the settlement of any such
controversy or dispute; and make public such findings and recommendations whenever in the judgment of the Board the interests
of industrial peace so require."
*

.

Persons devoted to classification did not know whether to call this
mediation or arbitration. It was mediation plus exposure to a public
opinion possibly hostile to the recalcitrant who refused to accept the
announced recommendations. Even in "pure" mediation rumor might
serve to brand a party as obstructive; this did more: it gave the winning side approval of its claim by high authority. On the other hand,
it was arbitration minus the pledge to abide the issue. What it meant
beyond such dangling definition would have to wait the Board's performance and the public's response.
The Board was organized on the familiar tripartite member basis:
public (3), labor (4), employer (4), all appointed by the President.
Later there were many alternate members, but in matters brought before
the full Board where a roll-call was asked decision was made by the
eleven regular members or by alternates only for absent members. In
ordinary course, a case was handled by a division or ad hoc panel, one
member (either regular or alternate) from each class, the labor men
being of the federation to which the union in the case belonged (if any).
The first Board died because it was unable to evolve a policy on
the union security issue for which it could win acceptance. The Board's
professed credo was voluntarism, an appeal to interest and patriotism.
Its chairman, William H. Davis, was fond of quoting Plato "that the
creation of a cosmos out of chaos is a series of victories of persuasion
over force". "To me," he has said recently, "it is a very inescapable
fact. I often think that I would like to escape it, but I am firmly convinced that, though you can protect a created situation, perhaps, by
force, you cannot create by force." But the words "persuasion" and
"force" are capable of many meanings in practice. It is not the least
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interesting question in connection with the work of these Boards what
the words have meant and to what extent the Platonic dictum is a workable ideal. The question bears crucially upon practice in a democracy beset by hostile forces within and without. But it will be giving
away no secret if we anticipate our conclusion that the solutions are
being compounded of persuasion and force. Whether, to the extent
force has entered in, there is no creation suggests further questions of
attribution, of measuring, of definition upon which the ordinary layman would not venture. He sees only that such and such a thing is or
is not being done, and if it is, he concludes that there has been creation. The Platonic dictum is too severe and single to be acceptable to
ordinary understanding, to that relaxed observation which goes by the
name of common sense; on a superficial view, at least, force seems so
often to reach its immediate objective however it may color the character of the achievement and the possibility of perpetuating it. Indeed,
Mr. Davis in humorous appreciation of the paradox, frequently says
in an aside: "Except for. rape". But does not the exception destroy
the validity of the proposition as a universal? However conceived,
the baby will be very tangible though in the one case it may have to
grow up in a less friendly school. It occurs that much of our modern
legislation in the very field of labor relations has more than a smaitering of rape. The Wagner Act has been at least a "shot gun wedding"; it may never quite outlive its antecedents, but we all entertain
hope that once the parties get to know each other the future will move
more and more on the desired level of persuasion. I do not wish to be
captious concerning a conception which embodies so much of high and
matured wisdom, above all for the practice of solving labor difficulty.
But we cannot fully understand what has happened unless our analysis
faces reality as we are given to grasp it. The dictum recoiled upon
the Board itself when the Board forced union maintenance upon the
mployers in order, as it said, to foster peaceful and stable relations;
the employers making the point that such a relation could not be sired
by compulsion. Yet Mr. Davis is right to emphasize the primacy of
persuasion; he can by intensity of conviction and good-will instill himself and his staff with a sense of community for all those over whom
his jurisdiction extends. He can cultivate a reluctance to violate the
psychology of cooperation unless all else fails and emergency seems
to demand a minimum result. The Board's procedure in its initial
approaches was true to the ideal of persuasion, 4 but open-eyed understanding of the process could hardly put out of view the power to
4. This procedure is described in detail in the Report on the Board mentioned
above.
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recommend as one of the circumstances conditioning the mediation
process. The parties understood that recommendations unheeded might
arouse public anger. Though such pressure is probably no different
in kind from other motives for agreement, the Board went further and
induced the President to seize the plants of recalcitrants. To enforce
obedience by plant seizure is to govern by force ("sanction"') in the
same sense as the imposition of a fine.
It has been observed, not without a bitter sarcasm, that if the activity of this Board and its successor be indeed sanctioned; it is only
against the employer. It might, of course, be said that in the nature
of the case there can be no command directed to employees or union;
normally there will be no more than failure to grant all or part of a
demand. Such a determination is self-enforcing as is the refusal of
relief to a plaintiff, and the purposes of a Iegal system are as significantly secured in this way as in any other. But the point can be made
that a union may be commanded to embody certain terms in an agreement and by, implication at least to work (rather than strike) at those
terms; indeed, that interpretation is the heart of the matter. The
history of law and legislation has shown that not even in war times
is it easy to find sanctions against a strike: the larger the strike, the
Imore
futile its repression, which is, of course, no more than an illustration of a general social law. 5 President Wilson (following Churchill's example in England) did, however, threaten workers who struck
against a decision of his War Labor Board with a Work or Fight
order; i. e., a cancellation of their deferred draft status and of their
employability in any war production. 6 The device was effective and the
present War Labor Board has hinted at its use.7 In one case before
5. During the last war the English Munitions of War Acts (1915) made a strike
in violation of a compulsory arbitration award punishable at the rate of 5 s. per day,
and the Defense of the Realm Act (DORA) made incitement to strike (obstruction
of munition manufacture) a very serious crime. *Yet, after the passage of the Munitions Act there continued to be as many, and by 1917, more strikes. The government only occasionally prosecuted under the Act, resorting instead to negotiation. In
the famous Clyde strike directed at government military and industrial policy, the
government exercising powers under DORA deported nine leaders to distant parts.
The strike lasted one week; the leaders were not returned home for fourteen months.
In 1917 the Minister of Munitions, Winston Churchill, threatened certain strikers with
conscription. "Trade uinion opinion;' says M. B. Hammond, "throughout the country
on the merits of the strike was divided and after a few days most of the men returned
to work." For an account, see M. B. HAMMOND, Banis3H LABOR CoNrMONs AM
LEGISLATION DURING THE WAR (Carnegie Endowment igig) c. IX. It has been observed by W. Jett Lauck of the English experience that no statute making strikes illegal will entirely prevent strikes, though the presence of a penal law may prevent union
strikes and serve as a reminder of public opinion. In a large strike only a few may
be punished and are then regarded as victims. BmrisH INDusTRrAL ExPEmRNCE DuRING THE WAR, Senate Doc. No. 114, 65th Cong, ist Sess. (1917) i067-8. See Lenhoff,
Traits and Trends of War Labor Law (1942) 2 Lwms Guim REV. 25, 28.
6. No. 132, Bridgeport case. See EPoRT: NATiONAL WAR LABOR BOARD (i92)
25, 36 (Letter of the President to the strikers).
7. General Cable Co. and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, WLB
No. 247, o LAB. REL. REP. 788 (i942).
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union shop and union maintenance that the question of formulating a
policy was important or contrdversial. In a number of respects the
Mediation Board proceeded upon the basis of well-understood principles, though they may not have been made explicit. One of the principles of the first War Labor Board was the recognition of labor's right
to organize and to bargain collectively. Since this principle had been
enacted into law, it was, of course, equally a principle of the Mediation
Board. The Board accepted as binding the provisions of the NLRA
together with the interpretations of these provisions by the NLRB.
Furthermore, the Board refused to permit one party to a collective
agreement to open up an existing contract during its life unless the
other party agreed. The present War Labor Board has generally
adhered to that rule, 14 although in the recent United States Steel Corporation case "I it departed from it significantly in order to standardize
wage conditions throughout the steel industry; thus the technicalities
of contract yield to the inexorable march of uniformity. The principles of the War Labor Board (1917) provided that in fixing wages,

hours, and conditions of labor regard should always be had to labor
standards, wage scales, and other conditions prevailing in the localities
affected, and that minimum rates of pay should be established which
would insure the subsistence of the worker and his family in health
and reasonable comfort. These are principles which have since then
been enacted into law or so thoroughly accepted that inevitably they
would be and have been applied by the Mediation and present War
Labor Boards.
It was on the issue of union security that the first War Labor
Board did formulate and the National Defense Mediation Board is
believed not to have formulated a principle or to have acknowledged
earlier decisions as precedent. In the case of the first War Labor
Board a conference of employer and employee representatives had
14. As in Postal Telegraph Cable Co., and Midland Steel Products Co. and United
Automobile Workers, WLB No. 85, io LAE. REL. REP. 505 (1942), in both of which
was stressed the great value to labor of maintaining the integrity of collective bargaining agreements.
15. WLB No. 364, IO LAB. REL. REP. 888 (1942). The collective bargaining
agreement called for a twenty-day notice to reopen its terms. The notice was not
given until July 21, 1942. The raise was nevertheless made retroactive to February
15, 1942. The Board based its decision on the proposition that wages including retroactivity of changes had been uniform in the steel industry for twenty years; that its
Little Steel award was retroactive to dates ranging from February 6-io, and a radically different date here would produce inequality entirely contrary to the expectation
of everyone; failure to give notice was due simply to the union's feeling that there
was no need of it, since the Little Steel award would be determinative. The decision
is an interesting instance of the general drive of our system toward larger uniformities
independent of contract. But more recently in a case involving a subsidiary of the
Steel Corporation, the Board held that the contract was too clear to be ignored and
more significantly that its wages did not follow Steel and there was no expectation
to that effect. Tenn. Coal, Iron and Ry. Co., WLB No. 465, II LAB. REL. REP. 248
See, further, note 37, infra, and accompanying text.
(1942).
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agreed upon a set of principles prior to the establishment of the
Board. 6 Among these principles was one providing that strikes or
lockouts should not be resorted to for turning an open into a closed
shop, or the reverse; that the union shop if established should continue;
and that employer refusal to grant a closed shop was not to be deemed
a grievance. It was understood that this commitment was given in
return for the principle which had not until then been accepted that
employers should not in any way interfere with the right of the workers to organize and to bargain collectively through chosen representatives. No such agreement preceded the formation of the Mediation
Board. It was at first the opinion, at least of the majority of the members, that the Board itself, being primarily a mediatory board, could
not consistently adopt a set policy upon a matter concerning which
there was basic disagreement between employers and employees. To
some extent this attitude was a true reflection of the mediatory nature
of the Board. It was emphasized by the fact that all recommendations
of the Board with a few exceptions were made by panels. This permitted the equities of each case and the talents of particular Board
members to play a greater part in the decision than if it were controlled by generalities. It made it possible to secure agreements based
upon concessions which would not have been forthcoming if a set policy
had blocked the way. The mediatory nature, however, of the Board's
process did not fully explain the refusal to adopt 4n explicit principle for
union security claims since the Board was also semi-arbitral in character. The tripartite composition of the Board explains much. It had
not only to solve the controversy before it, but to do it without disaffecting the Board members. The difficulty arose when it was called
upon to take positions which seriously offended one or the other group
and which could not be fortified by a reference to well-established
governmental policy.
But talk of precedent, it will be said, has no place here. Precedent is for justiciable controversies of which these are none. Precedent
implies the power and the duty to govern by rule. There must exist a
matter as to which, given the state of morals, or of public opinion, or
the balance of social forces, it is possible to state a rule. If the sum to
which these forces add up is fairly clear, then custom or constitution
endows the courts with the precedent function; if not so clear, the
arithmetic will need the legislature whose function after all is precedent-making in even a more absolute sense. The legislature may not
have a duty to follow, but it does have the power to make precedent;
and for the end in view the difference is simply as to when the precedent
16. REPORT NWLB (1921) 32. For the work of the Board, see Gregg, The National War Labor Board (919)
33 HARv. L. REv. 39.
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is first conceived to have been in operation. It is hardly to be denied
that the Mediation Board was n6ither quite a court nor again a legislature; and labor controversies were somewhere just beyond the pale
of the justiciable. It was not inherently impossible to formulate rules
for the solution of labor controversies: regarding the right to bargain
collectively, that had been done; regarding hours, wages, and union
security, it had not been done at that time. As to some of these items
the economic system demanded flexibility, and as to others no force
had been powerful enough to write the rule it wished.
II
The National Defense Mediation Board foundered on the issue of
"union security." This phrase of somewhat recent coinage is used
loosely to describe a variety of formal devices which strengthen or
secure the hold of a specific union over its membership or potential
membership. Organized labor has traditionally sought the closed shop
under which the employer could hire only persons already union members. Criticism of the monopoly implications of the device led to a
modified form: the union shop under which the employer is free to
employ whom he wishes but the employee must within a specified time
become a member of the union. Early in its history the Board recommended a "closed shop". Thereafter it never recommended it again.
It fell back instead on a more recent innovation whereby employees
who were members of the union at a given time must remain members
for a given period: "union maintenance". This was granted in some
cases, refused in others. The United Mine Workers then asked for
the union shop. It was refused; the CIO members withdrew, and the
Board collapsed. Let us examine this history in more detail.
In the relatively early Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding
Division case, 17 the Board "recommended" the closed shop. In this
case, upon the insistence of the government, all of the Pacific coast
shipbuilders agreed to uniform wage standards and abolition of strikes.
Practically all except Bethlehem, which employed 20 of the workers,
agreed to the closed shop as well. The closed shop thus served in a
degree as a quid pro quo for the forced agreement on wages and thus
appeared to implement the government's policy of a uniform wage.
Probably even more important, at least in our context, was the fact
that the Board still looked upon its function as exclusively mediatory.
It had reason to believe that the employer would accept a public recommendation for a closed shop. This enabled it to state in all sincerity
that it was seeking simply for a just and workable solution in the case
at hand. It would not, could not, be a precedent since it was not
17. MB No. 37, 8 LAB. REL. R..

614 (1941).
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adjudication, not the application of a rule to the facts, but negotiation
of a modus vivendi for this unique situation. At least the labor members so insisted, and were in this joined by the public members in answer
to argument by the employer members: that this was a precedent for
government imposition of the union shop, and that a mediatory board
without law-making authority, without Congressional declaration either
general or specific should not establish a policy which altered so fundamentally the structure of industrial organization.
For a time after Bethlehem the Board was able to avoid the heart
of the issue. In the spirit of the Chairman it struggled 'valiantly with
the minds and souls of the parties to bring them into mutual accommodation. It had some success in settling a number of controversies
with the novel formula of union maintenance. This formula seemed
a brilliantly inspired device to reconcile an insoluble conflict, a positive
preservative of the status quo. On the one hand, it did not force upon
the employer the closed shop; it left him free to hire whom he chose,
since a new employee need neither be in nor join the union if for
any reason he did not wish to do so. On the other hand, by requiring
those employees who were members of the union to remain members
it protected the union from disintegration. It must be kept in mind
that the union was being asked to forego its ordinary weapon of protection: the strike. This device then appealed as in essence a kind of
well-balanced bargain, as a regulation which froze rather than altered
the balance of power. Chairman Davis might well argue that if it were
forced upon an employer it did no more than "protect a created situation". Yet, of course, it did restrict the employer's power to retain a
worker; a power which might previously have been exercised for the
valid reason of retaining an efficient worker or the discredited and not
avowable reason of favoring those who would break with the union.
It seemed then, for a time, that the Board might solve its great problem
by the union maintenance formula.
Even so the Board proceeded cautiously feeling its way from case
to case. Where union maintenance was recommended, special reasons
were assigned. The protest of the employer members that a policy
was being determined was met always with the reply: this Board
neither knows nor makes precedent; it suggests only to the parties a
fair basis of agreement. The employer members insisted that an appeal
to specific considerations, at least where embodied in written opinions,
inevitably built up a just expectation of future recommendation. In the
meantime the panels were at their work. In the North American
Aviation case,' the officers of the national union had not objected to
i8. MB No. 36, 8 LAB. REL. REP. 66I (Ig4I).
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the use of troops to break the strike. The indirect effect had been
greatly to weaken the local union. "There was an urgent need for reviving the union in order to assure stable labor relations, and the quarrel
between local and national leadership made it doubtful whether the
national leadership could restore it without the assistance of the maintenance of membership clause. In the Western Cartridgecase, 19 it was
clear to the panel that the employer had persistently fought unionization even during the course of proceedings before the NDMB so that
the union, deprived of a strike weapon, would have been disabled from
protecting itself against the employer's activities. Finally in the Federal Shipbuilding case, 20 the union by agreeing to the Atlantic Coast
Zone Standards of wages, hours, and working conditions had in the
interest of stabilization limited its importance to workers and given
up its right to strike at the very time that, due to the rapid expansion
of the shipbuilding industry, a great number of new workers were being
introduced without trade-union experience. It was thought that in such
a situation a maintenance of membership clause was necessary to enable
the union to protect its organization.
It was obvious to the lawyer, wise in the common law, and to the
student of society that, however flexible, however capable of deflection,
here was emerging a pattern of reasoned judgment bearing significant
formal and functional resemblances to the law. A controversy arose,
a great organ of government brought the parties before it, facts were
roughly got together (the basic facts were usually obvious), a case
stated, arguments heard, and judgment given. The judgment was
attributed to the facts-which implied that whether articulate or not,
there was a premise or a group of premises which made the facts
relevant to the conclusion. The premises as we can grasp them are
obviously of the sort which seek to reconcile opposing forces, to fashion
for these forces a coherent plan along which they may move harmoniously together without either sacrificing too much of what is felt
essential to its form and function. This type of regulation, both
because of its character and its source, will be felt as close to if not
completely law. There might still remain a question whether it will
prevail, whether it will be accepted without demanding a test of the jurisdiction purported to be exercised, and of its ultimate sanction. If it
prevailed without such a test, many would be inclined to say it was
something less or quite distinct from law, though it might parade in the
garments of the law and do the service of the law; even if it prevailed
after a test, the vagueness of the powers exercised, the lack of a precise delegation of jurisdiction plus the still exceedingly flexible ("politig. MB No. 44, 8 LAB. Rm_..REP. 779 (1941).
20. MB No. 46, 8 LAB. RE.. REP. 820 (94).
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ical", it would be said) character of the criteria might still leave the
fastidious categorian unconvinced of its specifically "legal" character.
If it did not prevail at all or only here and there against the more
vulnerable (those who depended on government contracts) it could
hardly muster as regulation and would not yet have reached law's
estate.
The first test came when the Federal Shipbuilding Corporation, a
subsidiary of the United States Steel Corporation, refused to accept
the union maintenance recommendation. The Board was forced to
consider more objectively and precisely the nature of its activity. From
the shadowy and fruitful realm of broker plenipotentiary, must it
emerge into the clear, sharp light of lawgiver? The employer members
sought to impale the insistent employee members and the anxious public members upon the horns of doctrinal dilemma. If the Board
appealed to force, then unless it was prepared to exercise power on
the basis of sheer whim it must evolve criteria; it must set standards
of relevance; in short, it must make law. But the hammering out of
major policies which impinge on otherwise established rights, the making of law, is for Congress. 20a The reply never quite met these arguments head on. The appeal was simply to realities which pressed upon
and oppressed the public members. Production must go on; the unions
must be given something if they were not to strike, or friction were
not to reduce productivity. The Board or eventually the President
might, of course, have let the issue mature into violence and be carried
before Congress, and so have accepted the major premise of Congress as
the law-maker. But it appeared that the Congressional forces or, more
profoundly, the forces which they represented were at an impasse: a
sufficiently powerful group was unwilling to yield to the unions, yet
afraid openly to oppose them. If the formal law-making organs cannot or will not function in crises, what are the alternatives? There is
admission of defeat or there is finally martial law. This sterile solution
might indeed be preferred by those who stood for the least possible
change in the structure of industrial relations: better temporary substitution of emergency power (it would be secretly felt) than a declaration purporting to attribute obligations not previously recognized. Is
Congress. then, the only law-maker? The courts have been at their
cryptic job of legislation this many a year; of course, it will be said
there inheres in them that mystical essence, jurisdiction. But did not
the President have an available jurisdiction? Legal research, 21 it ig
true, has been unable to establish any clear statutory authority for com2oa. See the recent advertisement of Montgomery Ward protesting the WLB's
union maintenance order. N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1942, p. 17.
55 HARV. L. REv. 427, 511-518.
21. Note (942)
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mandeering these plants at least in the "emergency" period before December 7. Section 9 of the Selective Service Act 22 did authorize it in

case of a "refusal" or "wilful failure" to manufacture goods for which
there was a "compulsory order", but it is not obvious that a refusal to
put in force certain employment terms is a "refusal" or "wilful failure"
to manufacture, unless it be said that the likelihood of a strike makes it
such. Specific legislation to cover the situation was rejected by Congress. The Executive orders taking over the plants of North American, Federal Shipbuilding and Air Associates 23 refer simply to powers
"vested in me by the constitution and laws of the United States, as
President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy". The power might be found in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to requisition material needed for the army, though
the argument is strained. But given Congressional silence and a widefelt sense of public urgency, the power seems, if not to rest, at least to
receive pragmatic verification in its exercise and the consequent public
acquiescence. Such power, it may be hazarded, might contain the magic
seed from which "law" grows. It will be objected again that the bare
power is to take over plants, not declare law. Yet, is he who exercises
power to be condemned because he explains the reasons for his actions,
because he seeks therein to realize, to embody his conception of what is
right? Let it not be thought there was so much high talk as this. The
Board simply asked the President to take over the plant of the Federal
Shipbuilding Corporation. The end, however, was not yet. A sanction
paradoxically is no assurance of the effectiveness of law. If too many
employers were recalcitrant, the taking over of their plants would not
be workable. If the law-making energies are too much absorbed in enforcement, the whole effort is likely to be abortive. It is another way of
saying that the proposed rule has got too far beyond the complex of
power and custom upon which law must rest.
We cannot say what would have evolved had not the Captive Mines
case come first to cut the ground from under the Board, and then by a
startling reversal Pearl Harbor to set it upon higher ground. The
aftermath of the FederalShipbuilding case itself was humiliating fruit
for the well-intentioned Board. The Navy was put in charge. W\Then
union spokesmen demanded that the Navy agree to put the maintenance
provision into practice, Chairman Davis said in the presence of the
Secretary of the Navy that questions of enforcement would be referred
to the Board. Some union complaints against defaulting members
were referred to Chairman Davis, but what he told the Navy to do was
22. 54 STAT. 892 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. app. §309 (Supp. 1940).
23. EXEC. ORDER 8773, 6 FED. REG. 2777 (i94I) ; EXEC. ORDER 8868,
4349 (941) ; EXEC. ORDER 8928, 6 FED. REG. 5559 (94).

6
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never revealed. Meantime, the Navy kept its tongue in its cheek. Thus
the provision for union maintenance was not enforced, and in the end
the plant was returned to the Corporation free of commitment though
not of the Nemesis which was finally to prove irresistible. In the meanwhile, the Board made no further recommendations for union maintenance except in one case in which it was mistakenly led to believe that
it was acceptable to the employer.
The Captive Mines case 2 4 was the check-mate of the FederalShipbuilding case and brought the game to full stop. Here it was the
union power which destroyed the whole tenuous, elusive frame of reference. John L. Lewis had recently secured union shop agreements
with nearly all the commercial operators in the bituminous coal industry. The steel industry guarded its captive mines from this final capitulation which the steel industry as a whole had spent decades in resisting; it feared the closed shop in its mines, as an opening wedge. The
union already had large majorities in most of the Captive Mines, though
not in all. 25

The position of the union was: we are entitled as of right

to the union shop and if we are not given it we will strike. In the face
of this there could hardly be a pretense of mediation and the question of
the nature of the Board came more acutely into issue than ever before.
The Panel had recommended arbitration and the union had said "no".
A strike took place despite the pleas of the President,2 6 and after maneuvers behind the scene the President announced that the parties had
agreed to submit the case to the full Board for its recommendations.
There was no agreement to abide by the recommendation. The Board
met in an atmosphere tense with the silent fury of giants at issue. Here
24. Bituminous Coal Operators and United Mine Workers, MB No. 2oB, 9 LAB.
RE.. REP. 287 (I94i).

25. Ibid. Approximately go% of bituminous was mined in union shops; 959 of
the miners were members of the United Mine Workers. In a few cases UMW membership in a mine was less than So%; and in a few, miners were members of AFL
unions or unaffiliated unions.
Bituminous Coal Operators, Case No. 2oA, involved a mine in Kentucky which
had a contract with the Progressive Mine Workers, who were twice successful in an
election. The United Mine Workers protested the election, and the conduct of the
NLRB officials. When one-half the workers reported at the mines they were greeted
with about x,ooo shots from the surrounding hills. One person was killed and 28
houses destroyed. The NDMB found itself incapable of bringing peace to this mine.
The eventual "arbitration" awarding the UMW the union shop must have settled this
controversy inter alia.
26. John L. Lewis replied to the President: "If you would use the power of the
state to restrain me, as an agent of labor, then, sir, I submit that you should use that
same power to restrain my adversary in this issue, who is an agent of capital. My
adversary is a rich man named Morgan, who lives in New York. . . . In the interest of settlement, I would be glad, Mr. President, if you concur, to meet with you and
my adversary, Mr. J. P. Morgan, for the forthright discussion of the equities of this
problem."
To this the President replied in part: "Whatever may be the issues between you
and Mr. Taylor or you and Mr. Morgan, the larger question of adequate fuel supply
is of greater interest and import to the national welfare. For the third time your Government, through me, asks you and the officers of the United Mine Workers to authorize an immediate resumption of mining."
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it was thrown into the arena hardly knowing whether it was umpire or
victim, naked of any equipment viable for the job; already forewarned
that if it decided against the union, it would probably decide nothing;
and if for the union, that its decision would be put down to coercion.
The controversy had thus burst the bounds of the justiciable, at least
in terms of the Board's resources. Doubtful political judgment threw
upon the Board a load so likely to jam its machinery; a judgment
symptomatic of a dangerous impasse and failure in the law-making
organs.
The unions and the labor members in earlier cases had always insisted that a recommendation for union security would create no precedent. Here they whirled sharply around and insisted that the case was
governed by the Bethlehem Shipbuilding case; but they grounded their
claims of right more deeply in the situation itself : in their great majorities in the mines, in the union shop pattern in all except the Captive
Mines, and in their asserted power by strike to make the pattern universal. It was a powerful case, the facts overwhelmingly impressive,
the spokesman at that time still the foremost symbol of labor's force
and aspiration. It was just this overwhelming force which offended
and alarmed the Board. If a man is appointed ostensibly to judge and
to exercise choice and then told he has no alternative, he is apt to avoid
the ignoble imputation by saying "no"; and he may believe, not without
reason, that he is answering for more than himself. There was alarm
and anger at what seemed a defiance of the whole society. Was the
Bethlehem case distinguishable? Of course every case is, but were the
distinctions significant? In the Bethlehem case the government itself
had pleaded for and finally forced on the union uniform wage terms;
the closed shop--agreed to by all employers except Bethlehem-might
be looked upon as a quid pro quo. Some of the Board members were
disturbed at the monopoly implications in the later case. Whereas in
the Bethlehem case the closed shop would not exclude non-union members from many other building trades jobs, union shop in the coal
mines would cover practically all the jobs available to the men in the
question. This issue as to whether requiring union membership by
governmental edict violated still valid tradition was to continue to be
a source of trouble. But there is a point, I think, which lies deeper
than the likenesses or differences of the two cases. The Bethlehem
case was decided by a Board still mediation-minded; the labor members
were correct, I believe, in arguing at that time that it would not be a
precedent. Since it was known that Bethlehem would accept the recommendation, the case remained psychologically within the frame of
mediation. With the Federal Shipbuilding case, the "Age of Ino-
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cence" was over. Having used force there, the Board was committed
to force. Using force, it was driven by the notions which prevail in
our polity to justify its action as deriving from a sufficient principle;
not, of course, one which was merely defensible in the abstract, but one
which took into account all of the factors relevant in making law,
including its own obscure authority. The principle of the FederalShipbuilding case, if it had one, was that if a union in need of the protection of the strike weapon gave up that weapon, protection for it should
be devised by the Board. The Mine Workers refused union maintenance as useless and unnecessary; it needed no protection; it demanded rights. In their dissenting opinion Philip Murray and Thomas
Kennedy, both officers of the Mine Workers, stated that the case had
not been considered on its merits and meant that despite every circumstance "the traditional open-shop policy of the anti-labor employers
must prevail .

.

.

The precedent had already been established in the

Bethlehem Steel Company case. Without reason, without logic, without argument the claim of the United Mine Workers of America is
denied." Although they believed in mediation, they said they found it
impossible any longer to place confidence in the Board. The next day
they, and shortly thereafter all other CIO members, resigned.
The public reaction to the decision rejecting the claim for a union
shop revealed the profound difficulty of fixing the frame of the Board's
action, of ascertaining the criteria by which the decision was to be
judged. The most troubling argument against the Board's action was
that it had failed to give the union what it had the power to get. This
might mean that the Board had committed a politic blunder, since the
union would in any case take the union shop and it would be better
politics to appear to give it. This was in fact more or less what finally
happened. The President was unwilling to risk a strike and the taking
over of the mines by the military. He proposed arbitration to John
L. Lewis who refused, and then, after the names of the arbitrators
were revealed to him, accepted. But the argument may rest on more
than the narrow ledge of momentary expediency; it may express the
general philosophy that the law represents the underlying equation of
economic force; that if the display of force is to be foregone, its probable gains should in justice not be denied. But this assumption is
undemonstrable and unworkable. We are sure, of course, that force
works in and through government and law, but the only test of ultimate
force would be to withdraw government and law and let him win who
can. Short of that there is no instrument which measures power, no
slide-rule which translates a given force into a given law. It was just
this appeal to arms which the Board was to foreclose and of necessity
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must foreclose by some conception transcending the unknowable dictate of force.
A government which as a matter of principle laid itself open to
be played upon by the assumed dominant force of the moment would
have only fear for its mentor and chaos for its destiny. Force, of
course, always lies behind, and if its claims are too completely ignored,
it will redress the balance by an appeal to arms; but government and
law, particularly as embodied in democracy, seek constantly for ideal
conceptions which moderate forces toward a mean. I think the Board
acted constructively in maintaining and building up in face of overwhelming power the principle of its union maintenance recommendations. If a more narrow expediency must for the moment prevail, as
it often must, there were others better suited who could act as it dictated. It is in one sense a question of the division of function, for
I do not suggest that in such situations notions of expediency are inappropriate. Ultimately all government including judiciary rests on
shorter or longer views of expediency; the longer view is aptly called
principle as against the shorter. In all government functions there are
those great deep pockets of discretion into which expediency may reach
its hand, and success depends on the accuracy with which the organization gauges its function in terms of sensing, creating, and acting upon
appropriate long and short term considerations. Though certain types
of activity presumptively fall within one or the other class, there are
no rules for intermediate situations as our story will show. Mediation
may or may not contain the germ of adjudication. Much depends on
the time, the occasion and the mediator. At the same moment the
President's Emergency Board under the Railway Labor Act was striving to recommend to the railway industry an acceptable wage settlement. At its first try it failed to satisfy the unions which threatened to
strike. It reconvened at the President's insistence and found a more
acceptable answer. It was apparently deeply embarrassed. It explained
that its first decision was arrived at by processes of reason conformable
to its "quasi-judicial", "fact-finding" function.27 It would be improper
27. The Board in its report stated that it had originally acted as a "quasi-judicial
body" called on to "weigh the pleadings, the evidence, and the arguments presented
by the parties, and on the basis of the record to make recommendations that not only
would be fair as between the parties, but would also serve to broaden public interest.
. . . An emergency body, when assuming a quasi-judicial role rather than a role as a
mediator, should not permit such considerations of expediency to dictate a recommendation which it would not feel warranted in making purely on the merits of the case.
"Public officers, however, when called upon by parties to help them settle a controversy by the process of mediation, cannot ignore the acceptability of any proposed
settlement to the particular party which has the greatest economic power to enforce its
demands in a labor dispute." The Board believed that if there had been time a new
board should have been appointed, so different is the role of fact-finding and a quasijudicial tribunal from that of mediator. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT T THE PREsIDEmN
7-9BY THE EMERGENCY BOARD (94)
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for it to have allowed "expediency" to change a decision which was
otherwise according to its view of the merits. Its second action was
as mediator, it explained: here the ultimate economic force of the parties might be considered; the Board concluded that it would have been
better, however, for another body to have mediated, as was finally done
in the Captive Mines case. One may question whether there were any
long term criteria, principles, or what you will which should have led
the Emergency Board to insulate a wage dispute from immediate views
of expediency. Of the merits of that controversy I do not feel competent to judge. The Board thought that there were at stake long term
considerations of the industry wage structure. Similar motives moved
the Mediation Board in the Captive Mines case. The Board, as the
sequel will show, evolved a workable principle for the time ahead.
III
The coming of war made industrial peace more urgent but easier
to win. The President called together a conference of industrial and
labor leaders under the chairmanship of William H. Davis. They
agreed to the tri-partite principle, though there were voices which said
that it was no longer a time for accommodation and that the new
agency should be entirely of public members. However the conferees
could not agree on the union security problem. The employer members
said it should not be within the new Board's jurisdiction. The President broke the impasse by saying he was glad to note that there was
agreement on a Board with jurisdiction to settle all labor disputes, and
sent the conferees home. The employer members announced that they
would accept the President's "direction". A conference spokesman
said that the employer members had indicated beforehand that they
would, if necessary, accept whatever the President directed. 28 This
so-called "agreement" raises again, in connection with the very germ
of the whole arrangement, the issue between persuasion and force, and
reveals once more how difficult it is to analyze the situation in those
terms. 2 9 It is enough, I believe, that some method of settling disputes

was imperative and that no other method was offered. The Board
unanimously asserted its jurisdiction; but it is rather unfair and somewhat ironical to claim for the jurisdiction whatever merit consent may
28. N. Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1941, p. I, col. I.

29. Long ago Aristotle was troubled by the question of when action was involuntary. He arrived generally at the conclusion that any willed exercise of the faculties
was voluntary (at least in the absence of ignorance of the facts) for purposes of ethics,
since no action was taken entirely without causing facts (motive). See NIcHomA-

CHEAN ETHIcs BooK III. Of course such a statement is perhaps evasion of our prob-

lem, since it might be thought merely to restate it in terms of different types of motives, e. g., to avoid governmental penalty, to be thought a nice man, etc.
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be thought to bestow. Indeed, I-would say that part of the significance
of the method is that in some measure it has proceeded irrespective of
consent; this feature is notable among Others which work together to
give to its results their specific character.
The formal procedure of the War Labor Board is similar to that
of the Mediation Board,30 yet certain aspects reveal a significant difference. Thus though panels still hear and make recommendations, the
decision is made in every case by the full board. This emphasizes the
adjudicatory as opposed to the mediatory factor in the present procedure. It increases the likelihood of working up a basically uniform
if still flexible policy. Occasionally the litigants and the members
seek rhetorical advantage by characterizing the. Board's activity as a
continuation of the collective bargaining process. In Little Steel, the
Board, asserting its jurisdiction over all questions of wages and union
security, said:
"In wartime, there is no basis for questioning the power of
the President to order what amounts to compulsory arbitration
for the settlement of any labor dispute .

.

. which threatens the

war effort. The President, having entrusted this duty to the
National War Labor Board, it follows that those who challenge
a decision of the Board, challenge the war powers of the President."

31

It would be a gross mistake to suppose that the Board no longer
seeks to persuade the parties to come to an agreement, or to overlook
the fundamental qualification that the Board is a tripartite organization
so that the process of persuasion must be carried on within the Board
as well. But it is now clear that beyond the point where persuasion
fails to convince the parties or a minority of the Board an enforceable
order will issue.
With this secure sense of the plenitude of its power, how has the
Board handled the problem of union security? It will be recalled that
the Mediation Board groped its way toward the intermediate position
of the union maintenance formula and was then crushed between the
antagonists. Two of the four public members came over to the new
Board. We are already familiar with the philosophy of Chairman
Davis, with his inexhaustible drive to find an acceptable via media
Frank P. Graham, President of the University of North Carolina, is
a democrat, a modest and earnest man, and a practical philosopher of
the mean. To these two public members were added Wayne Morse,
For a description of the procedure see Poole, The National War Labor Board
A. B. A. J.395, 466.
31. Bethlehem Steel Corp. et a[. and United Steel Workers of America, WLB
Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, io LAB. RE.. REP. 675, 68o (1942).
30.

(1942)

28
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trained in the habits of mind of a law school professor, and George
Taylor, for many years impartial arbitrator of the collective agreement
in the silk hosiery industry. These were all men favorable to the
claims of Labor for an increased stake, an expanded vote in the system,
yet inclined toward accommodation and mediation. I stress the character of these men; however much we are abstractly or propagandistically committed to a notion of the inevitability of mass forces, our
moral apprehension still fastens on the individual as a responsible and
valuable factor in social construction. Lecky well states this feeling:
"A healthy civilization implies a double action-the action of great
bodies of men moving with the broad stream of their age, and
eventually governing their leaders; and the action of men of genius or
heroism upon the masses, raising them to a higher level, supplying
them with nobler motives or more comprehensive principles, and modifying, though not altogether directing, the general current." 32 The
men of the Mediation Board -had wrestled with souls by day and by
night to bring employer and worker together under the sign of union
maintenance. Broadly speaking, it was this solution which now prevailed, sanctioned by the increase in presidential power and in the public
apprehension of emergency. Some solution there must be and this
solution, being in the field, won in part by default and in part by its
brilliant reconciliation of opposed forces and principles.
The War Labor Board has never yet granted the closed or union
shop to a union which had not already previously secured it. And
though it has stated that it has no absolute rule against it,3 3 it seems
for all practical purposes to have rejected it.34

In a recent case

34a

the

company was ordered to continue the closed shop provision in the just
expired contract, lest change in the status quo induce restlessness which
would interfere with production. The President, commenting on the
Captive Mine case, stated that government would never compel any one
to join a union, and went so far as to suggest that government coercion
32. 2 THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF RATIONALISm IN EUROPE (1897) 372.

Professor

Llewellyn in his comprehensive outlining of the forces that go into law-making, The
Normative, the Legal, and the Law Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method (940) 49
YALE L. J. 1355, 1389, expresses the same conviction: ". . . I grow as clear that some
individuals in key-positions and at key-moments have tremendous shaping power as I do
that mass-reactions of the 'growth'-sort may have their own lines of semi-irresistibility. . . .. Neither the "Great Man Theory" nor the "Volkgeist" is exclusive; the
extent of stress at any one moment depends on the interest and purpose of the observer.
33. In Caterpillar Tractoi Co. and Farm Equipment Workers, WLB No. 63, 10
LAB. REL. REP. 642 (1942), Dean Morse in his concurring opinion says noncommitally:

"The Board in turn has analyzed each case on its merits and to date it has not been
satisfied that the evidence presented in any case has justified its directing the establishment of a closed or a union shop."
34. Lloyd Garrison, Panel Member, so states in United States Rubber Co. and

United Rubber Workers of America, WLB No. i8o, io LAB. REL. REP. 7
(1942).
34a. 15 Clay Sewer Pipe Mfrs., WLB No. 349, II LAB. RE. REP. 404 (I42) ; ci.

case cited note 36a, infra, and commented on in the text.
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would not be compatible with accepted standards of freedom. Whether
or not this puts the matter too high, it has seemed clear that employer
and even general public resistance is too great to make the national
emergency the occasion for so radical a shift in the balance of industrial forces. To this extent there has been acceptance of the employer
argument that Congress alone is adequate for such a change in the law.
The now characteristic form of the Board's union maintenance
formula appeared in the Marshall Field case, 35 the first case in which
it ordered union maintenance. It contained a form of the so-called
"escape clause" which provided that an employee need not maintain
union membership unless he personally elected to do so at the time of
the beginning of the agreement. This clause was in itself a notable
triumph of reconciliation. 35a Employer resistance to the union shop
and to the lesser union maintenance has always stressed the fact that
these devices coerced the individual employee; this employer concern
for his employee's freedom of action has excited much ironical comment. Furthermore, it has been observed in reply to the employer
argument that an employer who voluntarily enters an agreement for
a closed shop similarly limits his employee's freedom. But a negotiated agreement may be the result of the union's superior power; that
the employer under such circumstances limited his employee's freedom
of action does not necessarily justify government in compelling him to
do so. 36 In a recent case an employer refused a closed shop to the CIO
though he granted it for the previous three years to the AFL. The
panel in imposing union maintenance considered the escape clause inappropriate but the Board nevertheless granted it.3 6' There is here in
question the application of governmental force which may consider
equities independently of the particular individual need or advantage.
The President himself had said that government would require no
one to join a union. Narrowly considered it would seem immaterial
in terms of some assumed ideal of personal freedom whether the indi35. WLB No. Io, io LAE. RF.. REP. io9 (1942).

35a. It is interesting that the escape-clause was first adopted upon the suggestion
of an employer by NDMB in one of its last cases. Hammond & Irving, MB No. ini.
36. Member Graham, however, accepts the argument. He puts it this way in
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al. (U. S. Steel Corp.) and United Steel Workers,
WLB No. 364, io LA . RP . REP. 888 (1942), in connection with an order for the
check-off :
"Those who hold that the freedom of the worker is protected in peace time by a
corporation's own agreement to compel its workers to join a closed-shop union and to
accept the compulsory binding check-off cannot hold that it is a violation of freedom
in wartime for the War Labor Board to ask corporations, on the basis of this record,
to accept the less security for the union as provided in the voluntarily accepted maintenance of membership and the voluntarily accepted check-off."
36a. Pioneer Gen-E-Motor, WLB No. 220, ii LAB. RaL. REP. 13 (I942); but cf.
15 Clay Sewer Pipe Mfrs., WLB No. 349, I LAB. REL. REP. 404 (1942), in which a

company was ordered to continue the closed shop though it may have been with the
same union.
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vidual is coerced by his fellows or by government; indeed many prefer
the latter as more disinterested. But the specific facts of the moment
might reveal that government force will be a sanction of private force
rather than a moderator. The issue of personal freedom, however,
involved in union maintenance is comparatively narrow since by
hypothesis the employee has already chosen to join the union and
has assumed the obligations of solidarity inherent in the relationship.
Freedom as a going value is not regarded as inconsistent with. the
obligation of contract, though concepts drawn from the realm of the
practical and at times from the realm of ideals represented by the
13th Amendment have set limits upon the specific enforceability of
commitments involving close human relationship. But no one has
ever denied that there may be sanction by way of penalty for breach,
which in this context would be loss of employment. A marginal
contention is that the contract of union association does not pledge
the member to fidelity as a condition of being permitted to continue
employment. It is true that there are no such words in the bond, but
it is an avowed objective of unionism to secure the union shop and it is
not strained to regard membership as consent to the union objectives.
What then is the theory and justification of the "escape clause"? The
answer is that the clause was almost entirely an effort to win over the
employer members. "If", said Roger D. Lapham, dissenting in the
Federal Shipbuilding case, "the contention is correct that members of
a union intend to be so bound by virtue of joining a union, what then
can be the possible objection to giving each of them an opportunity to
express his wishes?" The labor members thought that the objections
were considerable. In the Walker-Turner case concurring they said:
"Any decision which the Board makes, be it on wages, or
grievance machinery, or overtime payments, will be contrary to
the wishes of the employer or the union or both. This Board has
no qualms about making decisions in regard to any and every
condition of employment, except that of union security. There
is no justification for any distinction. The primary question in
each case must be: what settlement, in view of all the circumstances is most likely to bring about maximum production of war
materials in a given plant? Having arrived at a decision dispassionately, we cannot permit ourselves to be deflected by
philosophical discourses on the subject of voluntarism."
But the answer to this somewhat cavalier way of putting the
matter is that the subject of voluntarism is anterior to arriving at a
decision however dispassionate; clearly there is nothing inconsistent
with the binding force of a Board decision contrary to the parties'
wishes and a regard for what the decision will require of unrepre-
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sented parties. Behind the objections of the labor members is the
conception of union solidarity and effectiveness; the notion of the
mandate given to the leadership to build up the union. The disruptive
tendencies of referenda are accentuated where a hostile employer may
offer advantages to doubters and opportunists; it is natural and proper
for the leadership to stress as the limit of membership control the
majority rule concept rather than individual self-determination. The
"escape clause" reaffirms an individualistic notion of the collective
bargaining agreement which the majority rule of the Wagner Act has
done much to dissipate. We have already seen evidence of the tendency
toward standard employment terms, toward equality rather than individual choice, though it is preeminently in this matter of membership
that the issue still hangs in balance.3 7 "The record is clear", says
Dean Morse in the InternationalHarvestercase, "that the union maintenance plan proposed by the public members in this decision would be
vigorously opposed in peacetimes because in the eyes of labor it would
involve unjustifiable governmental encroachment upon internal union
affairs." It is for these reasons that the labor members sacrificed
something in principle if not in present fact in agreeing to the "escape
clause" in order to win the employer members; I say not in present
fact because very few employees have availed themselves of the "escape
clause". This might be offered as proof of the fairness and acceptability of the maintenance clause as far as the employee is concerned;
but it may be offered as well to demonstrate that in this moment, at
least, the industrial society can without danger of disintegration offer
its members a choice, thus stimulating responsibility in both the members and the leaders. To be sure there is also Member Lapham's explanation that the member "even if he really wants to, will find it difficult
to resign from his union. There is an old saying 'You're in thearmy
now'." 38 The Board has recognized the possibility of "coercion" of
37. Cf. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904) 335: "The re-

vision of the scheme [of economic life] aimed at by trade-union action runs, not in
terms of natural liberty, individual property rights, individual discretion, but in terms
of standardized livelihood and mechanical necessity." Professor Lenhoff similarly
notes the trend toward standardization in his article, A Century of American Unionssm
(I942) 22 BosToN U. L. REv. 357, 369, 373, but he is more positive than Veblen in that
whereas Veblen was content to "epater le bourgeoisie" by announcing this disagreeable
fact as inevitable without seeming to take sides, Professor Lenhoff regards the majority rule concept of the Wagner Act as a great and distinctive political achievement.
In Europe, he points out, labor was never given a similar power of self-determination,
and standardization, if accomplished, was done by executive decree, thus emphasizing
the fatal habit of the European executive toward aggrandizement.
Other issues of standardization versus voluntarism versus contract, etc., have been
noted at p. 281.
38. International Harvester Co. and Farm Equipment Workers, WLB No. NDMB
4, 4-A, 89, 1o LAB. REEL REP. 279 (942) (carried over from NDMB; decided by
WLB).
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the employee by the union and has unanimously written into some of
the agreements clauses against coercion. 38 a It may seem surprising that
the labor members have without protest allowed these clauses to be
formulated, since it has been a point of labor policy to resist legislative
formulation of any coercive notion which could be used to qualify the
union's legal position. The objection, however, was said to be due not
to the principle but to the possible hostility of an enforcing agency
which acting on a reference so difficult to define could question many
standard union tactics. In so far as the Board itself or its nominee is
designated the judge of coercion, its good faith could not be questioned
by its own members.
If the "escape clause" went to some lengths in reaffirming the
American credo of individualism, it did not for a time accomplish its
purpose of winning the employer members to the union maintenance
clause. In the Walker-Turner case and in the InternationalHarvester
case, the "escape" was more limited. In the former an arbitrator might
permit a resigned member to hold his job on continuing to pay dues;
in the International Harvester case, the acceptance of the clause was
conditioned on majority acceptance but the individual was given no
option. In these cases employer hostility and inter-union strife led the
Board majority to reject the possible disruptive tendencies of individual
choice. But finally in a group of cases led by the Ryan Aeronautical
case, 39 the Board reviving the "escape" in a new form won over two
of the four employer members. In the Marshall Field form only
members who elected were covered; in the present form all are covered except those who withdraw. Member Lapham, concurring, continued to sound a doubting note. He explained his affirmative vote as
due to the adoption of the personal "escape clause". Yet he raised
again the point that Congress alone was competent to lay down a rule
fundamentally altering the labor relation; he maintained that the unions
in return for power should be "willing to accept the corresponding
responsibility and regnlation that goes with it".
These doubts flared once more into dissent. In the International
Harvester case Public Member Morse, falling naturally and soothingly
into the old and no longer persuasive rhetoric, said, "It does not follow
that this plan will establish any precedent to be applied in other cases".
38a. The Board has found it necessary recently to warn unions and employers
against interfering with the free choice of the employee to resign from the union,
either by specific pressure or by a union rule.
39. WLB No. 46, io LAB. REL. REP. 537 (1942). The Marshall Field formula of
affirmative individual acceptance was again applied in Dallas Mfg. Co. & Golden Belt
Mfg. Co. and Textile Workers' Union, WLB No. 151, II LAB. REL. REP. 68 (1942),

on the ground that it was the customary form in the Southern textile industry; it was
combined with the check-off.
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But as Member Lapham foresaw,, in almost every case the Board came
to grant the maintenance clause. Here and there the Board upheld panel
decisions refusing it because of the newness of the union, lack of need,
or lack of employer hostility. 40 However, in the most important cases
the maintenance clause was given. 41 In some of the cases instances of
employer hostility to unionism were said to determine the need of the
union for maintenance, or if evidence of employer hostility was lacking, it was enough that the employees feared it. 42

In the Little Steel

case the situation in that respect was ambiguous. Of the historic hostility of the Industry as a whole there could be no question, but the
panel found that at least after certification of the Union in 1941, the
four companies (Bethlehem, Republic, Inland, and Youngstown) had
negotiated in good faith; union membership ran from 70% to 75%.
The panel found as to Inland that since a strike in 1937 which ended
without a contract, the company had met regularly with the Union's
Grievance Committee and in good faith attempted to adjust and settle
all grievances brought to its attention. The panel believed that there
was evidence of a policy of opposition by all four companies, but "no
new anti-union practices have had their inception during the past two
years". The opinion of Member Graham is not afraid to ride the horns
of dilemma for a new view. "Not only does the record show that
this Union is worthy of security and responsibility, but the history of
unionism in the Steel Belt in general and the fears remaining from
experiences in Little Steel in particular make necessary and wise more
definite provisions for the freedom and security of the union." But
the repentance of the companies points not to refusal of the maintenance provision as unnecessary, but rather provides a "solid groundwork for a voluntarily accepted pending maintenance of membership
40. As in Bower Roller Bearing Co. and International Union, WLB No. 12, 1o
LAB.

RE '. REP. io6 (1942), Remington Rand and United Electrical etc. Workers,

WLB No. 44, io LAB. REL. REP. 312, 752 (i942), Arcade Malleable Iron Co. and

Steel Workers Organizing Comm., WLB No. NDMB 84, 1o LAB. REL. REP. 379
(1942), and White Sewing Machine Co. and United Electrical etc. Workers, io LAB.
REL. REP. 382 (1942). However, in these cases thepanel granted a "voluntary, revocable" check-off.
41. In International Harvester Co. and Farm Equipment Workers, WLB No.
NDMB 4, io LAB. REL. REP. 279 (1942), referendum on maintenance was granted
over the contrary recommendation of the majority of the panel, employer members and
public member Professor I. L. Sharfman, who noted (a) this was the first contract;
(b) CIO had won over AFL by a small vote. Further progress should be secured in
the company-union relationship by "the educational process and . . . not . . . be the

result of government compulsion." The Board replied, "It is imperative that the War
Labor Board design the framework of cooperation . . . in order to minimize the possibilities of further inter-union struggles and in order to stabilize and increase war
production in the company's plants."
42. E. g., Phelps-Dodge Corp. and International Union, et al., WLB No. ii4, 10
LAB. REL. REP. 6oo (1942). Suspicion of the employer and the disruptive presence of
inter-union rivalry are the reasons given in the panel report. The Board wrote no
opinion.
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and check-off as definite assurances of good will and mutual cooperation for all-out production to win the war."
In the Caterpillar Tractor case, Public Member Morse angrily
scolded Industry Member Lapham for going back on union maintenance after he had called upon the Board for the "escape clause" and
won it as the price of his adherence. Member Lapham in turn became
very angry at being lectured by Member Morse: "Labor leaders still
demand privileges and favors because they have given up the right to
strike. This is plain bunk, with a capital 'B'. What citizen has a right
to strike in a war for his country's existence?" Lapham's more particular objection was his belief that the Public Members were granting
maintenance in practically every case in which it was demanded regardless of the so-constantly iterated statement that the recommendation in one case was not a precedent for any other. This, to be sure,
was nothing more than Lapham professed again and again to foresee.
Somewhat contradictorily he objected in earlier cases to the Board's
singling out employer hostility as a reason for maintenance: it is not
up to the Board to judge between good and bad employers, he argued.
But the argument was directed to showing that Congress should determine the criteria for granting "privileges", if such there were to be. In
the Caterpillar case, Lapham pointed to the fact that the Union was
young, had never before had a contract, had won by a narrow margin
over a competitor and faced an employer with no particular evidence
of union hostility. Such a union apparently could not in Lapham's
judgment lay claim to special position by reason of its own merit of
established responsibility or the company's demerit of attacking the
union. But Morse countered with the reply that the case was not unlike
the InternationalHarvestercase (in which Lapham said he would favor
the recommendation if it had an "escape clause") and so inevitably fell
back on precedent. Furthermore he now emphasized that "though
acting in entire good faith, the company has held the Union at a distance and has not dealt with it so as to remove from the minds of its
employees any notion that the Company was hostile to the Union and
was unwilling to treat with it fully".
In the Little Steel case the employer members charged that these
various reasons were a subterfuge and that the search was for the formula by which maintenance of membership is to be required rather
than for the question of whether union security should be granted in
any case. Dean Morse vehemently denied these charges in his concurrence in the Caterpillar case. The cases reaching the Board, he said,
were all "difficult cases" which had defied settlement, in a large proportion of which there was ill feeling; if union maintenance would not
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enhance production, it would not he given. Then, in a warning which
may explain Member Lapham's heat, he continued, "It may not be
amiss to point out to employers who still seek to keep alive the union
security controversy that the American people may grow weary of their
tactics".
Member Lapham's charge suggested the following possible formulations: the Board grants the union maintenance not only where the
Union needs it to preserve its status, but in certain additional cases for
the bald expediency of buying the good will of the demanding union;
or the Board grants it in all cases, to appease the unions; or because
it favors the principle of unionism. That such expediency enters into
the total seems highly likely. In some degree it is this factor which
may be implied when the uniqueness of each case is stressed. If our
study is taken to show that something approaching a rule of law is
evolving, to forget that it is still evolving would be distorting the
picture. The powers at the President's disposal, if broad, are vaguely
defined, are as much a sphere of influence as a jurisdiction. Presented
with a conflict of forces which defy measurement and analysis, the
President must somehow produce a result which first of all advances
the war effort; gives some expression and not too much offense to the
ideas which the conflicting forces represent; and which gives some
extra meed of recognition to the objectives of those with whom he is
allied and from whom he draws his support. If it were the fact that
the Board grants union maintenance in every case (in so far as universal) it would indeed be a rule of law, although it might be dictated
by love or fear of the unions.
In the more general vindication of its union maintenance policy,
the Board does rely on a philosophy which would come near to making
it universal. Certainly it goes beyond the case of employer hostility.
This, as Dean Morse says, is the usual case; in some cases the Board,
unwilling or unable to make an invidious finding, relies on the union's
expressed apprehension. A recent case shows that this is but one type
of a more general class. In the United States Rubber Company case,
the relations between union and employer were friendly, but the reconversion of the plant reduced pay, temporarily at least, and threatened
to hold up the readjustment of schedules for some period. It was
feared the men might drop out of the union in disgust. The union
through no occasion of its own making was likely to lose strength.
Membership maintenance was necessary to its security. This then is
the larger principle: that a union should be protected against the loss
of its present strength whether from employer hostility, rival unionism,
unfavorable employment conditions bringing the union into discredit,
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or other cause. In part the principle is based on an idea of what is
due to the unions which "have weakened their bargaining power by
voluntarily forfeiting the right to strike". It was this reasoning which
so disgusted Member Lapham, who argued, that since no one has a right
to strike when his country is in danger, no one gives up anything in
agreeing not to strike. Though technically a strike would not be in violation of law and so there is in Hohfeldian language still a "privilege"
(if not a "right") to strike, there is little doubt that the public today
would not regard a strike as morally "right"; it would thus be unfortunate to treat union security as a price owing for the "voluntary forfeiture" of a "right" to strike. Though psychologically this quid pro
quo factor can never (whatever the crisis) be completely absent in the
calculus of rewards and punishments which the law provides to keep
the social structure intact, there are reasons for the policy which rest
on a higher plane.
The union is the prime organization through which a majority
of the workers seek to realize their strength, to express their total
personality as it is involved in the industrial process, and to function
effectively in the government of industry. Thorstein Veblen long ago
indicated that such organization was inevitable. "Those who move
in trade unions are", he said, "however crudely and blindly, endeavoring, under the compulsion of the machine process, to construct an institutional scheme on the lines imposed by the new exigencies given by the
machine process". 43 The public members accept the trade union as
Margaret Fuller accepted the universe because, as Carlyle said, "Egad,
she'd better !" There is a job to be done. It can be done only through
the tools, the instruments, and the organization of those tools and
instruments which are the material and the inner life of the industrial
process. It will be said that the unions are not completely established,
that if they were there would be no question of security, and that the
war emergency is being exploited to advance their interest much beyond
what is inevitable. But they are fighting for status, and this fight,
which as Veblen suggested is almost instinctive, will from the nature
of the situation go on despite exhortation; it lies deeper than any
formulation in terms of a right to strike or the qualification of such a
right in time of war. These organizations pushing up toward the
light demand their place in the sun by the very reason that they are
becoming an integral factor in the social structure, by the very reason
of their inherent representativeness. They are among the great norm
creating institutions which press upon the society for the rules and the
43. THE THEORY

OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904)

336.
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sanctions to give adequate expression to their function. 44 Lee Pressman arguing for the CIO in the Little Steel case, said that if the unions
felt secure, they could devote their energies to production rather than
membership campaigning. This is at least the hope of the public
members as it must be the hope of the public in general. Unions
possess a potential for coordinating and organizing the efforts of their
members; the psychology and the philosophy of the unions may for
good or bad condition the temper of its members and even of the
whole industry. It is this potential which the Board is seeking to
harness to the public purpose by diverting it from intramural uses.
Public recognition of the union and protection of its status entitle
the public with good conscience to demand responsible cooperation.
In the Borg-Warner case 45 the panel refused maintenance because of the absence of differentiating circumstances. "A majority
of the Panel are in favor generally of maintenance clauses as matters
of industrial practice and Board policy. .

. At the same time, we

are of the opinion that at present any general policy in favor of
maintenance clauses must be stated by the Board itself." Thereupon
but without opinion the Board ordered the union maintenance clause.
Is there now then sub silentio a "general policy"? It was in the BorgWarner case and the S. A. Woods case,46 that some, at least, of the
employer members, including Lapham, 47 finally gave up their opposition, since "nothing constructive could be gained by continually voting
no as a matter of principle", though even they still dissent, when
as in the "Little" and "Big Steel" cases, maintenance is coupled with
a non-revocable check-off. 48 In their opinion the U. S. Rubber case,
44. Cf. the theses of Julian Huxley in a recent article, Living in Revolution

(1942) I85 HARPERS 337:

First,The war is the symptom of a world revolution.
Second, There are certain trends of the revolution which are inevitable. Within
nations, they are toward subordination of economic to non-economic motives; . . .
and toward greater social integration.
Third, During the present war both military efficiency and national morale are
positively correlated with the degree to which the inevitable trends of the revolution
have been carried through.
Seventh, . . . This releases the latent dynamism of the nation and the social system.
45. WLB No. I35, io LAB. REL. REP. 795 (1942).
46. WLB No. i6o, io LAB. RE.. REP. 793 (i942).
47. A good many still dissent in the absence of special circumstances. It is understood that employer panel members are under great pressure to maintain an attitude
of dissent.
48. However, in Golden Belt Mfg. Co. and Textile Workers' Union, WLB No.
I5, ii LAB. REL. REP. 68 (1942), member Lapham voted for a check-off tied to a
union maintenance clause. The latter was exceptional in that it required affirmative
individual adherence (the Marshall Field formula). There is not yet a sufficient
course of decision to predict Board action on the check-off. In Little Steel the checkoff had figured spectacularly in the dispute. There had been picket-lines, violence, etc.,
in attempts to collect dues. The problem of dues collection in such vast plants is very
difficult. It was this feature of disruption which was primary in the decision to grant
the check-off (which was not, of course, applicable unless membership was elected).
Having granted it in Little Steel, the pattern was inevitably followed in Big Steel. It
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"fixes a pattern applicable to all employees. But it is yet to be determined if such a pattern will be applied in favor of all unions, whether
they be responsible or irresponsible." Thus the new ground of union
maintenance is conceded by some of its more influential opponents;
there is at least an armistice which recognizes it de facto. Whether in
the general peace it will become de jure depends on the outcome of a
much vaster struggle. In the meantime the new battle ground is this
issue of union "responsibility" and "irresponsibility".
Member Lapham in the dissents 4 9 which followed his first dubious
concurrence complained that if the unions were to be given "privileges", they must accept responsibilities. They have, said he, consistently denounced any legislative attempt to regulate their activities.
The Board when it grants union maintenance should require the following to be filed:
i. Copy of constitution and by-laws
2. Names of officers
3. Amount of dues and initiation fees
4. Statement of receipts and expenditures
And furthermore that there be "incorporated in the collective agreements, an undertaking by the union that it will not during the life of
the agreement make, assume, guarantee, repay or participate in any
contribution, subscription, pledge or other financial obligation to any
political party or candidate for public office". The avowed reason for
the clause was to protect the union members from the dissipation of
their funds, though it was not suggested that the members have any
choice as to the inclusion of the clause. Most of this was substantially
the proposal of the Vinson bill which failed to pass Congress. To
Lapham's suggestion Dean Morse replied: "In other words the position
of the employer members .

. admits to asking the War Labor

Board to legislate certain regulations upon unions which Congress
has since been denied in American Magnesium Co. and United Mine Workers, WLB
No. 33, and Aluminum Company of America and Aluminum Workers of America et
al., WLB No. 64, io LAB. REI.. REP. 862 (I942), Norma-Hoffman Bearings Corp. and
United Electrical Workers, WLB No. i2o, IOLAB. REL. REP. 892 (i942)-in the first

two cases over labor member protest. The dissenters referred to the vast size of the
Aluminum Company's plants. They noted the cases cited in note 40 supra, in which at
least the voluntary, revocable check-off had been granted. But in all these cases it had
been proposed more or less in lieu of union maintenance and at a time when the union
maintenance clause was not yet granted as of course. In the Golden Belt case mentioned
above in this footnote, the check-off was granted as a feature of union maintenance
on the stated ground that it was customary in the industry (Southern textile) ; furthermore, the check-off applied only to individuals affirmatively electing (though it was
not revocable for the life of the agreement), whereas in Little Steel it applied unless
membership were given up.

49. E. g., Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. et al. (U. S. Steel Corp.) and United Steel
Workers, WLB No. 364, 1o LAB. RT. REP. 888 (i942).
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. It is the opinion of this writer that the position

they have taken is highly improper and constitutes a proposal which
exceeds the functions and purposes of the War Labor Board." 50 And
in the later S. A. Woods case, Chairman Davis, using words no doubt
intended to bring a blush to the cheek of the employer members,
argued that to extend a continuing control over a labor union "...
would be to indulge in the worst vice of administrative tribunals-an
attempt to extend jurisdiction beyond the frame of reference under
which the tribunal acts. The decisions of the board made under its
executive order to finally determine labor disputes should certainly be
confined to provisions which establish contractual obligations between
the parties to the dispute".
This categorical argument must have afforded the employer
members some wry amusement if nothing more, since it was just the
argument of exclusive legislative competence which they had opposed
to the grant of union maintenance. But the grant of union maintenance is more immediately referable to the settlement of an industrial
dispute than is the collateral regulation of the union. Granting that
"the frame of reference" had not the fixity and precision implied, it
still may be maintained that one is closer to the core of the reference
than the other. Yet the public members themselves have not taken
too literally the argument of their "incompetence". In the same decision Chairman Davis points out that "as a matter of practice the board
requires a submission of the constitution and by-laws of the union".
In the Walker-Turner case the Board makes a great deal of the character of the union. It notes that admission to the union is regardless
of race, color, or religion; that the officers are elected annually by
secret ballot; that the initiation fee is at the moment only $2.00 and
the dues $i.oo per month; that an accused member is entitled to an
impartial trial by the Local on stated written charges, with appeal to
the General Executive Board and from it to the Convention. It may
be said that to note the existence of these facts does not imply regulation; they are relevant facts which lie at hand to demonstrate that the
union is a representative and democratic organization close to its
membership and that it may fairly be granted the maintenance clause.
Even if the "frame of reference" is conceived most narrowly as no
more than will promote production, the good character of the union
entrusted with worker morale is relevant, and, as the Board now holds,
a condition of granting maintenance, though some of the Labor Members have recently argued that past irresponsibility is only one more
5o. Caterpillar Tractor Co. and Farm Equipment Workers, WLB No. 63, io
LAB. REL,. REP. 642 (1942).
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reason for maintenance.5 In the recent Monsanto Chemical Company
case,52 the Board gave content to the responsibility concept by denying
maintenance to a union which struck in the face of the general nostrike agreement, a decision useful as demonstrating both the Board's
good faith and as providing a deterrent to strikes. In the WalkerTurner case, however, the order of the Board provided also that "the
present dues and initiation fees of the union shall not be increased
except by the International organization". This provision is essentially
a "regulation" of the union, though in form it is a term of the contract
and sets a limit on the employer's duty to discharge a delinquent member. The labor members objected to this:
"No complaint was raised in regard thereto, or any mention
made of the possibility of future disputes on this score. Thus
fortuitously to regulate the internal affairs of a union is an act
which has grave implications and may create endless difficulties."
There are some who question whether, if the Board is to wield
governmental force, responsibility should be diluted by the dual
allegiance implied in the tripartite scheme. The scheme can hardly be
made to appear more palatable on the ground that it is largely pretense:
that is to say that decision is made by the public members with the votes
of either one or the other bloc; nor is that answer likely to satisfy those
who demand that the exercise of public authority be governed by an
assumed lofty disinterestedness for the public members may have to
blunt the sharp edge of their judgment to secure the vote of at least one
or the other bloc. Where policy has been established and clearly
formulated in rule or principle, there is no justification for introducing
interest representation into the role of judge or administrator. Assumedly, interest has already had its day in the earlier (legislative)
stage and to introduce it as a deliberate factor at the judging state is
to reopen the settlement. Insofar as the activity of the War Labor
Board is concerned with principle, it has been a working toward rather
51. In Aluminum Company of America and Aluminum Workers et al., WLB No.
64, io LAB. REL. REP. 862 (1942), in which the majority postponed the grant of maintenance in the Cleveland plant pending an investigation as to the cause of plant disharmony. The purpose, argued Reeve and Kennedy, of union maintenance is to promote harmony; hence it is immaterial why there is disharmony. "If the union leadership is found to be demagogic and irresponsible, a union security clause is certainly
desirable because all experience in management-union relations demonstrates that
demagogues breed on insecurity."
52. WLB No. 292, io LAB. REIL. REP. 896 (1942).
In the more recent General
Chemical Co. and Federal Labor Union, WLB No. 267, 11 LAB. RM. REP. 95 (094?),
the clause was denied subject to the understanding that, upon petition from the union
six months hence the matter may be reopened. In General Chemical Co., WLB No.
274, 11LAB. REL. REP. 309 (942) time for reopening to be approximately three months
from date of order. The rule will not be followed where the strike was not instigated
or condoned by local or international leadership. Worcester Pressed Steel Co, WLB
No. x42, ii LAB. REL. REP. 2zi (1942).
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than from principle; at the crucial stage its activity has been legislative. Legislation is basically a creative synthesis of multiple interests; though traditionally the interests have not been formally recognized in the legislative process, they have been represented in fact both
in the lobby and on the floor. Much recent legislation makes a place
for interest at the administrative (sub-legislative) level, and it is at
least arguable that such overt participation is more responsible than
that of the lobby. Furthermore, for many of the issues before the
War Labor Board no legislative principle could be found. This was
true until recently, at least, for the wage issue. The prevailing wage,
the wage relationship to a key industry, the change in the cost of
living, the income position of the employer, and the prestige and power
of the union were relevant criteria, but their application hardly added
up to a tight, authoritative answer. Inside the Board, as outside of it,
the process was essentially collective bargaining with a superimposed
referee. For this purpose, interest representation, as the organization
of so many arbitral boards makes evident, is logical if. not necessary.""
Where unanimity could be secured, the results commanded additional
prestige, and it has been surprising to what extent interest groups have
felt the detachment bred of public responsibility and so been won to a
unanimous consent. Where agreement has fallen short of unanimity,
public members have had at least the advantage of more intimate
insight into the limits of tolerance and allegiance on either side. In
Captive Mines, these limits were transcended, perhaps unavoidably
given the issue and the time. Today the task is much easier; the limits
much broader. But, however broad, however ill-defined or unacknowledged, limits do exist, and an understanding of these limits is still
useful to the public members. The unions won the maintenance clause
in face of persistent employer dissent, but that dissent did not go
entirely unheeded in the settlement. Then there came a time when the
need for a rule of limitation in wages became urgent, when suddenly
what was pre-eminently a bargaining, non-justiciable issue, cried out
for legislation. The rule of Little Steel was voted out this time with
employer members applauding and labor dissenting. No doubt both
of these moves could have been made by a "disinterested" public
authority; the later one was probably inevitable. Nevertheless, in my
opinion, it has been at least of moral and political value that the result
as a whole is the work of a tripartite Board. This will be obvious for
the matters that have been decided unanimously, but it applies as well
to the rest: that each of the dissenting groups won an advantage at
53. Cf., however, the views of the recent President's Emergency Board discussed
supra, at pp. 291-292 and in note 27 supra.
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the expense of the other has served to commit each group to the
validity of the whole and to engage its efforts in securing the consent
of its constituency.
CONCLUSION

The country, its survival as a democratic society, as a unique
integration, is threatened by hostile forces. To survive it needs nothing
so much as to function superlatively as a going concern. This is possible only if its citizens, those who fight and for whom there is fighting,
are carried on to the highest levels of technical and spiritual cooperation. But how shall it be done when the society itself is in transition,
when it is part of the very crisis of survival that these men: farmers,
workers, engineers, entrepreneurs, bankers and professionals are
struggling among themselves to establish or maintain their status? The
new society is being born in part out of the rape of the past by science
and mechanical invention. It is harnessed to the dynamo of a ruthless
rationalism which organizes all forces accordingly as each contributes
to mechanical production and reproduction. Against this violence of
rationalism, against its gigantic coordination of men and machines, the
older traditions struggle for preservation and metamorphosis. The
previous age had raised high the standard of individualism, of personal adventure idealized in the name of freedom. This freedom,
particularly as it serves personal interest, has seemed the most precious
portion of our heritage; it has been sensed as the meaning of our custom, of our institutions, and of our law. Thus in freedom's name and
in the many forms and interests which tradition has come to identify
with it, there is being waged a mighty battle. Some see it as a struggle
of annihilation in which the old freedom, freedom itself must eventually
be the loser. Americans-sanguine, experimental, practical, but withal
enamored of the meaning and even more of the promise of their tradition-look for a new integration, a transformation of the tradition
into forms which are in organic relation to the new industrialism.
Such a process at worst is civil or foreign war, or both at once, but at
the least it will involve some violence born of fear and aggression, the
destruction of some vested interests, the personal humiliation of many,
and the ending of old abuse and the beginning of new.
The struggle of the unions for status is at the heart of this vast
process, and there is no aspect of the great movement now remaking
our society which is not reflected in it. The fundamental premise of
our political practice insofar, at least, as it is positively creative, is
"gossip" (in the word of T. V. Smith): unabated, unhurried and generous compromise in the direction of each and all of the customary
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demands which have effective asking power. Now we are in crisis.
We function as nature and our tradition make us. Idle are the complaints of those who in the name of crisis ask for a truce on human
nature. We continue to gossip and ask for more; we try to be "good
disinterested fellows, but there are limits, and the fault in any case
seems to be with others rather than with ourselves. Under such circumstances our leaders cajole and threaten; if they are good leaders,
they seek to retain our traditional practice insofar as it is revered and
serviceable for in so doing they appeal to and nourish the genius of
the society.
The labor struggle seemed for a breathless moment to bring us up
against the terrible peril of an impasse between two of the most powerful organs of our society: the capitalist and the labor organizations.
The former appealed to the older tradition of freedom, to the liberty
to contract or not to contract as interest dictated, to a structure of relations in which the essential instrument of society was the adventuring
individual. The latter appealed to powerful current realities; the coalescence of economic energies into great aggregates sired upon the
machine by large de-personalized financial power, covering the whole
society with units so inclusive, so integrated with each other that personal adventure was of less and less relevance either as social motive
power or individual opportunity. Out of this grew the impetus for
labor organization as the power of labor to face the power of capital,
as opportunity for individual participation and individual power. Here
opposed to each other were forces either of which could do each other
great damage, either of which could threaten the security of the whole
society. These forces demanded recognition according to the nature
and aims of their organization-the one having it already in abundant
measure and fighting against diminution, the other hammering against
the citadel of vested forces. It was and is a time of fearful danger
because the opposing forces are obstinate and the obstinacy is profoundly reflected in the vital organs of government; in the highest
organ of formal policy-making, the national legislature, there was
gossip but no compromise. Yet the need for policy, for law, was
dreadfully imperative. Our constitutional scheme narrowly considered
does not endow the executive with original legislative authority, but
the President as delegate-extraordinary of Congress, as Commanderin-Chief of the Army and Navy, and finally as President of the United
States has a certain floating power. Power tends to create law, to
seek its expression in sanctioned relationships. This is the lesson of
the National Defense Mediation Board and the War Labor Board.
These Boards created law in part through the pre-eminent power and
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claim of the nation symbolized in the President, in part through the
sovereign spell of persuasion. This law was modest as befitted the
questionable parentage of its progenitors. The tradition was honored
in the breach, for if the employer was forced to modify the principle
of hiring and firing, yet the new relationship was limited at least to
those workers who voluntarily accepted it. Thus the principle of union
organization and leadership secured a new level of sanction: to prevail
upon the worker to join, the union must rely on its own devices, but
this victory would become by force of law its more than temporary
acquisition.
One last word: the public members often write that their sole
concern is to keep production going, to win the war; where union
maintenance will do this, then and only then will it be granted. Surely
this is not the whole reason. It is not at all obvious that any one
intangible is necessary to maintain production. If it were perfectly
clear to any rational being, we ought to grant that Member Lapham
would admit it. There are many ways to organize production; the
public members would organize it in a way which gives due recognition
to the just claims of the underlying forces as they see them, to the
emerging pattern of society as it appears in the realm of their conscience. Member Graham, speaking for the public members, expressed
this most explicitly. In Ryan Aeronautical, he said:
"From the logic of considering each case on its mer-its, there
evolved through the case system itself a pattern of decisions on
union security. The work of both Boards, fortunately under the
same chairman, has been characterized by a relentless search for
a reconciliation of stability and freedom, a fusing union security
and individual liberty in the midst of a world war."
In Little Steel he comes back to the theme, presenting it this time in a
large historical progression almost Hegelian in its pattern: "The
freedom of human beings to organize in autonomous groups has been
won through long struggles in the fields of religion, politics, business
and labor." In each of these fields humanity has sought to realize
itself against hostile forces in a characteristic organization: the Church
Universal against the Empire, Parliament against the King, and the
Corporation against the medieval Feudaries. "The struggle of industrial workers to organize and win the reluctant recognition of legislative
bodies, the courts, and the corporations, is the latest chapter in the
democratic struggle of human beings for autonomous organization
around a great human need."
This is more than patching up the trouble, more than keeping the
machine going with whatever will work for the moment. Trouble
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and need bring power into action, but solution is always a little more
than mere ceasing of trouble. It is hard to imagine a case so obvious
that there will not be a choice of patches, and choice implies an attitude
toward what should be. Here is choice based on broad, bold premises;
here is the conscious intention to mark out the ways of the future
according to a half-seen vision of justice and right.

